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Insider

Threat

Insider:
An insider is someone within an organization or with access to critical
aspects of the organization. An insider can be an employee, contractor,
consultant, or any person who has a relationship with or is in a position of
trust within the organization. The insider may be someone acting alone or
in collusion with others.

Threat:
A threat posed by an insider to an organization can be intentional
or the result of negligence on the part of the insider. Threats refer to
behaviors and related actions that pose a risk to the organization, as
opposed to the presentation of threatening language alone. Threats that
are particularly concerning include sabotage, espionage, theft, politically
motivated violence, terrorist acts, or general disruption to organizational
infrastructure or security. Such threats may originate from inside or
outside an organization. The actions that make up threats like sabotage,
espionage, terrorist acts, or insider threats include a range of individual
behaviors that are often referred to as behaviors of concern.

Organization:
An organization may be a business, government agency, utility, or similar
entity. Sometimes the organization is more broadly referred to as a target of
the insider threat.



T

his brochure presents a framework to view threats made by an
insider that are targeted or intentional (as opposed to negligent or
unintentional) and that involve some degree of deliberation (as opposed to
those that may be considered impulsive). The framework was developed
with the assumption that it must:
•

Be applicable for both anonymous and known subjects

•

Recognize interactions and patterns of behavior

•

Allow for investigation with whatever information is immediately
available

•

Recognize that behaviors or warning activity may shift, decrease, or be
emboldened by protective or organizational actions

I

nsider attacks are often handled internal to an organization and are
under-reported to law enforcement agencies. This has limited the sample
of insider threats available for research in this area. Most of the available
literature related to insider threats exists in areas outside of behavioral
science. It is generally conceptual in nature rather than data driven and
often focuses on threats to information systems.
The field of threat assessment represents a blending of behavioral science,
intelligence, and law enforcement strategies. It evolved from practices used
to assess and manage dangerousness (potential risk for violence).



T

hree principles have created a foundation upon which behavioral
science models in threat assessment have been built. These principles
from the threat assessment approach have been applied to targeted
violence and provide a framework for conceptualizing insider threats.
1. Targeted violence is a process that takes place over time, during which
the subject (person(s) posing the threat) must prepare and plan.
2. Targeted violence results from the interaction of the subject, a stressful
event or triggering condition and a setting that does not prevent the
violence from occurring (context).
3. Successful assessment of targeted violence involves identification of the
subject’s continuum of attack-related behaviors (behaviors of concern).

T

he actions that make up threats like sabotage, espionage, terrorist acts,
or insider threats include a range of individual behaviors that are often
referred to as behaviors of concern. Behaviors of concern become markers
that can signal a threat when they are considered as the product of the
interaction of factors related to the subject, the organization (target), or the
context affecting both.

Insider Threat
Terrorist Acts

Sabotage
Espionage



Rather than relying on profiles to assemble risk information about insider
threats, investigators should consider behavioral indicators in conjunction
with environmental clues to assess motivations and other subject factors
related to insider threats.
This approach is distinct from the technique of offender profiling, which
seeks to determine the type of individual most likely to commit a certain
offense based on inferences made from crime scene characteristics.
Creating a profile for someone posing a threat of targeted violence directed
toward an organization would be difficult because it is a low base rate
activity. A profiling approach would likely falsely identify a large number of
individuals as potential risks while missing many of the people who really
do pose a risk.



Organization of behavioral indicators and environmental clues in an insider
threat investigation can be guided by asking key questions in specific areas
of inquiry1.
Areas of Inquiry

Critical Questions

Behaviors of Concern that Prompted
Iinvestigation

•

Subject Factors

•
•
•

•

•
•
•
Protective Factors

•
•
•

Organizational

•
•
•
•

Situational/Contextual

•

What is the nature of the breach that
caused the inquiry?
What other behaviors of concern were
observed or later discovered?
Is the subject or suspect identified?
Are there other potential accomplices?
What are the potential motives for the
behaviors of concern?
What personal characteristics of
subject enhance and/or mitigate the
threat?
How capable is the subject in carrying
out the threat (e.g. access, expertise)?
What is the subject’s personal
situation?
What are the human, technical and
physical security measures in place?
What protective resources may have
been compromised?
What was necessary to compromise
protective factors (e.g. behavior,
technical expertise, level of access)?
What is the organizational culture and
climate for security and reporting?
What is the organizational history with
regard to security compromises?
Are there recent events that could
affect security and/or risk?
What is the nature of the asset being
targeted within the organization?
What situational or contextual factors
relate to the breach or attempted
breach (e.g. political, media, social)?

1 A model for conceptualizing insider threats with more specific examples of what to
look for is on pages 8-11.


Behavioral Science Insider Threat Model
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Directly Observable

HIGH CONCERN
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BREACH: may include acts of espionage, theft, violence, or sabotage perpetrated by
an insider
Warning Signs/Behaviors of Concern:
boundary violations within target/organization . information technology or other technical
violations . threatening/intimidating behavior . problematic travel and related behavior
with foreign entities . concerning financial behavior . acts suggesting organizational or
national disloyalty.
Protective Factors
.human . technical . physical . security

Target/Organizational Factors
. national security value / criticality of the
asset . security and reporting climate
within the targeted organization . barriers
to emplolyees sharing security concerns .
organizational sensitivity to reporting and
addressing security breeches

Subject Factors
. history of malicious activity and related
attitudes . personal vulnerabilities (financial problems, substance abuse) . symptoms of mental illness (emotional instability, paranoia) . dual identity or conflicting
loyalty . technical expertise . motives
(employer / institutional grievances, political or ideological issues, financial / greed,
personal stressors)

Situational/Contextual Factors
. political climate . recent national or international events of note (politically controversial issues, recent terrorism activity, recent hoax activity, increased rhetoric related to
extremist issues)



Behaviors of Concern and Behavioral Warning Signs
Suggested From Literature Review
(Factors from Empirical Studies in Italics)
Type of Behavior of Concern
Work-related Boundry Violations

Behavioral Indicators
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

Attempts to gain authorized access
to accounts beyond the scope of an
employee’s job responsibilities
Accessing materials or attempts to
access materials not appropriate to job
responsibilities
Stealing items from work
Undue curiosity or requests for
information about matters not within
the scope of the insider’s need to
know
Asking others to facilitate access to
information with which the insider does
not have access
Unauthorized attempts to remove
material from the work area
Taking classified material home or on
trips
Unusual work hours—especially if less
supervision or vigilance is likely
Storing classified material at home
Unauthorized work at home
Bringing unauthorized cameras or
recording devices to work and/or
not using them in relation to a social
function
Recent isolation from coworkers
Extensive use of the copy, facsimile,
or computer equipment to reproduce
or transmit documents that may
exceed job requirements
Testing reactions to security threats
Improper escorting of visitors
Suspicion of media leaks



Type of Behavior of Concern
IT / Technical Violations

Behavioral Indicators
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Threatening / Intimidating Behavior

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Financial

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Pattern of security violations
Stealing administrative level
passwords
Attempts to get coworkers to share
passwords
Attempts to create unnecessary
shared accounts
Attempts to bypass technical
safeguards
Hacking activity or statements i.e.:
ability to do so
Lax security habits
Increased outbursts/ aggressive
posturing directed at coworkers
Strong reactions to organizational
sanctions
Escalation during work-related
conflicts
Verbal or physical intimidation of
others
Verbal or physical threats
Violence at worksite or target site,
bragging of violent activity at other
venues
Stalking behaviors
Spending on fantasy-related items
Approaching a former coworker for
help in changing financial data
Increasing complaints to supervisors
regarding salary dissatisfaction
Unexplained affluence
Reckless or compulsive spending
trends, gambling
Unexplained cash
Overspending, credit problems
Reports of calls from creditors at home
or work
Denial of credit
Garnishments
Bounced/ bad checks
Bankruptcy
Negligent/ late child or spouse support
payments

Type of Behavior of Concern
Misuse of Travel / Issues with Foreign
Contact

Behavioral Indicators
•
•
•
•
•

Disloyalty

•
•
•
•

•

Unreported contact with foreign
nationals, government, military, or
intelligence officials
Unauthorized travel
Vague/ evasive, e.g.: recent travel
Short trips to foreign countries for
unusual or unexplained reasons
Failure to comply with regulations for
reporting foreign contacts or foreign
travel
Behaviors indicating disloyalty to U.S.
(e.g., possession and use of a foreign
passport)
Associating with people who advocate
use of actions against the U.S.
Actions indicating a fascination with or
desire to engage in “spy work”
Actions to detect physical surveillance:
searching for listening devices/
cameras, leaving traps to detect
search
Sympathetic references to foreign
interests/issues

The University of Nebraska, operating under a contract with Mantech International and funding from the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field
Activity Office, was asked to develop behavioral science guidelines related to
the detection of insider threats. The project began with a survey of available
literature followed by a series of facilitated expert panel sessions to inform the
development of these guidelines. The study of insider threats is dynamic. These
guidelines are based on what we know today and are sure to evolve as we learn
more about them through research and practice.
An open-source and classified version of the project findings are available
through the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity Office.
For further information, contact Denise Bulling, Ph.D. at dbulling@nebraska.edu
or Mario Scalora, Ph.D. at mscalora1@unl.edu.
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